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A COLONIAL CASTLE: DEFENCE OF PROPERTY
IN R V STANLEY
Alexandra Flynn and Estair Van Wagner*
In 2016, Gerald Stanley shot 22-year-old Colten Boushie in the back of the
head after Boushie and his friends entered Stanley’s farm. Boushie died
instantly. Stanley relied on a hangfire defence, rooted in the defence of
accident, and was found not guilty by an all-white jury. Throughout the
trial, Stanley invoked concerns about trespass and rural crime (particularly
property crime) that raised much evidence of limited relevance to whether
or not the shooting was an accident. We argue that the assertions of trespass,
without formerly raising the defence of property or trespass, shaped the trial
by providing a racist, anti-Indigenous-tinged narrative to try and justify, if
not excuse, Stanley’s use of a deadly gun, without requiring those elements
to be properly considered by the jury through a formal invocation of those
defences.
En 2016, Gerald Stanley a tiré une balle dans la tête de Colten Boushie,
âgé de 22 ans, après que Boushie et ses amis se soient introduits dans la
ferme de Stanley. Boushie en est mort sur le coup. Poursuivi, Gerald
Stanley a invoqué le moyen de défense de long feu qui trouve ses racines
dans la défense d’accident. Un jury composé exclusivement de personnes
blanches l’a déclaré non coupable. Tout au long du procès, Gerald Stanley
a fait valoir les inquiétudes qu’il avait au sujet des intrusions et des crimes
en milieu rural (particulièrement ceux contre les biens). Ces inquiétudes
n’avaient qu’une pertinence très limitée quant à la question de savoir si le
coup de feu était le résultat d’un accident. Les auteures déplorent l’impact
qu’ont eu sur le procès les prétentions de Stanley sur l’intrusion, en l’absence
d’une invocation formelle d’un moyen de défense fondé sur les biens ou
l’intrusion. Ce narratif, teinté de racisme et de sentiments anti-autochtones
a tenté de justifier, sinon d’excuser, l’utilisation par Stanley d’une arme à
feu ayant causé la mort, sans qu’il ne soit requis au jury d’examiner ces
éléments correctement en l’absence d’une invocation formelle de ces moyens
de défense.
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1. Introduction
On August 9, 2016, at about 5 pm, on an otherwise unremarkable summer
afternoon, five Indigenous youths from the Red Pheasant First Nation
drove onto a rural Saskatchewan farm owned by 56-year-old Gerald
Stanley, a White farmer.1 The youths, aged 17–24, had spent the day
drinking and swimming in the South Saskatchewan River, after which
their grey Ford Escape SUV had sprung a leak. They had previously visited
a nearby farm where they had allegedly tried to steal a truck. While their
intentions are disputed, what is known is that after a series of events,
including the windshield of the youths’ car being smashed with a hammer
and the firing of a warning shot into the air, Stanley shot 22-year-old
Colten Boushie in the back of the head.2 Boushie died instantly.3 At the
ensuing trial, there was mixed evidence as to whether the youths were
seeking help or were planning to steal when they entered Stanley’s farm.4
1
Guy Quenneville, “What happened on Gerald Stanley’s farm the day Colten
Boushie was shot, as told by witnesses” (6 February 2018), online: CBC News <www.cbc.
ca/news/> [Quenneville].
2
Ibid. This article does not provide a full description of the events related to the
case. For more detail, see R v Stanley, 2019 SKQB 277 and R v Stanley, Trial Transcript
[Stanley Trial Transcript].
3
Quenneville, supra note 1. Note that this article does not set out a full description
of the events related to the case.
4
Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 2 at 284–328 (Eric Meechance, evidence in
chief & cross-examination).
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The police and the media immediately adopted the language of trespass
to describe the incident. According to the defence, Stanley drew his gun
when Boushie and his friends drove onto his rural property to fire warning
shots because he thought they were stealing his property. Stanley argued
that while he meant to fire warning shots, the gun went off accidentally
when Colton Boushie was killed.
Canadian law provides for defence of property through section
35(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code, which sets out the conditions for a
statutory defence for otherwise unlawful actions taken to protect property.5
Stanley did not expressly assert self-defence, or defence of property, and
instead formally relied on the defence of accident. However, the defence
repeatedly invoked concerns about trespass and rural crime (particularly
property crime), much of which was of limited relevance to whether or not
the shooting was an accident.6 Ultimately, the jury accepted the argument
that Boushie’s death was simply an accident, a byproduct of reasonable
conduct to address rural crime combined with a faulty weapon. As we
argue below, this strategic decision to rely solely on the defence of accident
meant that important elements of the defence’s narrative—including the
status of the youths as “trespassers”, the “terrifying” nature of the situation,
and the “reasonableness” of using a firearm to respond to the situation—
went unexamined, while nonetheless being allowed to shape the account
presented to the jury.7
The story of the Stanley case is more complicated than the tale of an
innocent farmer’s unfortunate-but-understandable accident that emerged
at trial. Narratives about property, trespass, and rural crime ran through
the trial and the media coverage. Indeed, the logic of the defence rests
squarely on the status of the Indigenous youths as trespassers, and the
right of Stanley to respond to trespass and the mere fear of property
crime with a firearm. The following sections of this paper explore how
these narratives were used to draw the unique and complex land-based
tensions in rural Saskatchewan into the courtroom in consequential ways.
As we outline below, these tensions played a troubling role in the trial,
allowing fear, racist stereotypes, and assumptions about who does or does
not belong in rural Saskatchewan to frame the defence’s story and try to
justify, if not excuse, Stanley’s use of a deadly gun.
In section 2, we explore the concept of trespass in Canadian law,
including the 2012 federal reforms of the defence of property in response
5

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 35 [Criminal Code].
Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 2 at 606–07 (Defence’s opening address), at
851–52 (Defence’s closing address).
7
Ibid.
6
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to calls for increased protection for property owners who expel alleged
trespassers from “their” land.8 In section 3, we examine the presumptive
story of trespass woven into the Stanley trial and consider the implications
of the defence of property, which was not put to the jury, for the shooting
that led to Boushie’s death. In section 4, we examine trespass and the
defence of property in the context of Treaty relations between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada. This paper does not present
the evidence introduced to substantiate the defence of accident, which
ultimately led to Stanley’s exoneration, although many other experts have
questioned its scientific validity.9 In our view it is crucial that the legal
profession confront how property and trespass were invoked to intersect
with, and compound, racism and colonialism in R v Stanley. As lawyers,
scholars, and judges, we must critically consider the consequences for
access to justice for Indigenous peoples and the future of our relationships
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada.
2. Invoking the Castle Doctrine: Trespass and Defence of
Property in Canadian Law
The intersection of civil and criminal law, the defence of property, and the
common law roots of the castle doctrine create a strange inconsistency in
how Canadian law treats trespass and the protection of private property.
Based on the same actions, an individual deemed a “trespasser”, can meet
with consequences ranging from a civil award of damages, to a modest
fine where trespass is proven by the Crown and enforced by the police; to
the application of force, including the use of firearms, by a private citizen
prior to arrest; to the involvement of the police or criminal justice system,
and any resulting form of trial. Notably, the scope of police responses to
property crime are generally limited, including restrictions on the use of
lethal force.10
In the context of the Stanley trial, the status of the youths as trespassers
played a central role in the defence’s version of events. However, the farm
was not enclosed with a fence. The youths were not asked to leave the
farm before a firearm was retrieved, nor before shots were fired. Indeed,
muddy shoe prints and a pair of shoes were found in the long driveway,
suggesting that some of the youths were attempting to leave the property.
8
Steve Rennie, “Were Harper’s comments on gun ownership misinterpreted?”
(23 March 2015), online: CTV News <www.ctvnews.ca/politics/>.
9
See e.g. Kent Roach, Canadian Justice, Indigenous Injustice: The Gerald Stanley
and Colten Boushie Case (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2019); David
M Tanovich, “Boushie’s family—and our justice system—deserves answers. So why
no appeal?” (8 March 2018), online: The Globe and Mail <www.theglobeandmail.com/
opinion/>.
10
Criminal Code, supra note 5, ss 25–27.
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No one called the police until after Boushie was killed. In contrast to
Stanley’s actions, the police response to the alleged trespass would have
been limited to charging the youths with a summary offence, carrying a
fine of no more than $2000. In our view, this case reflects serious problems
related to the construction and application of the “right” to defend private
property in Canada, as discussed below.
The civil law of trespass
Trespass is a longstanding concept in both criminal and civil law in
Canada, and is defined as, “the act of entering upon land, in the possession
of another, or placing or throwing or erecting some material object
thereon without the legal right to do so.”11 The essence of trespass is the
protection of possession and control over the use of private land, as well as
the privacy of the possessor.12
In civil law, trespass plays both a compensatory and deterrent role
in protecting the possession and control of land.13 It is a tort through
which owners of private land can enforce their right to exclude others
from their land. Courts can remedy the damage caused by trespass by
awarding damages, requiring someone to pay for having accessed the
land, or granting an injunction requiring the trespass to stop. In criminal
law, trespass can be an offence, and it can also be the basis for a defence.
The offence of trespass, s. 177 of the Criminal Code, applies in only limited
circumstances, having been specifically introduced to capture “Peeping
Tom” conduct and not “petty trespass.”14 None of the required elements
were present in Stanley.
Trespass is largely addressed as a regulatory offence under provincial
statutes, such as Saskatchewan’s 2009 Trespass to Property Act.15
Saskatchewan was the last common law province to enact specific trespass
legislation. Prior to this 2009 legislative enactment, civil action was the
main remedy for trespass in Saskatchewan, unless the trespass fell under
specific circumstances covered by statute, such as snowmobiling, or where
the police could intervene under the narrow Criminal Code provisions
11
Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation v Canada (AG), 2016 SKCA 124 at para 128, citing
Mann v Saulnier, 19 DLR (2d) 130 at 132, [1959] NBJ No 12 (QL)(SC (AD)).
12
Philip H Osborne, The Law of Torts, 4th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 295–
96.
13
Ibid.
14
R v Priestap, 79 OR (3d) 561, 2006 CanLII 12288 at paras 27–28 (CA).
15
SS 2009, c T-20.2 [TPA (Sask)]. The amendments removed the requirements for
notice or enclosure, effectively reversing the onus on landowners to those wanting to enter
private property.
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described below.16 This legislative gap may have contributed to a sense that
police enforcement against trespass and rural property crime was limited,
because in many circumstances the police had few tools available to deal
with situations of entry onto private land without consent.17 Notably, the
1980 Ontario reform to provincial trespass laws (similar to the scheme in
Saskatchewan’s 2009 Trespass to Property Act) was motivated by the need
to “facilitate prosecutions and increase the protection of interests of rural
landowners” and was a response to the perception that rural property was
under-policed.18
At the time of the Stanley trial, the Saskatchewan’s TPA provided for
police arrest powers and modest fines for entry onto private land without
consent, where notice was given or the land was enclosed.19 Until notice
was given, entry onto unenclosed private land could not be deemed
trespass until a request to leave had been made by the occupier and the
person entering the premises had failed to leave within a reasonable period
of time. Unlike some provincial regimes, Saskatchewan’s TPA does not
provide for citizen’s arrest.20 Where such powers do exist, they require the
person arrested to be delivered into the custody of law enforcement.21In
the aftermath of the Stanley trial, the Saskatchewan government amended
the TPA to shift the onus from the landowner to those seeking to enter
private property.22 Now, it does not include a notice requirement
in relation to entry in or on a lawn, a garden, a yard site, cultivated or
grazing land, the broadly defined category of “enclosed land,” and lands
designated by regulation. The government stated that the amendments
“better balances the rights of rural land owners and members of the
public” and cited the results of a public survey with 1601 respondents,
which was later criticized as “heavily flawed” and not representative of
the population.23 The amended Saskatchewan legislation goes further
16

See e.g. Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 26th Leg,
2nd Sess, No 31A (11 March 2009) at 2228 (Hon Buckley Belanger).
17
Ibid; see also Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 26th
Leg, 2nd Sess, No 9A (5 November 2008) at 1594–95 (Hon Don Morgan).
18
R v Asante-Mensah, 2003 SCC 38 at para 31, considering the 1980 Occupiers’
Liability Act, SO 1980, c 14.
19
TPA (Sask), supra note 15, ss 5, 6, as it appeared on 9 August 2016. Fines under
the Act are capped at $2,000, as they were before the amendment.
20
See e.g. Trespass to Property Act, RSO 1990, c T.21, s 9(1) [TPA (Ont)].
21
Ibid, s 9(2).
22
The Trespass to Property Amendment Act, 2019, SS 2019, c 26, ss 4, 7.
23
Government of Saskatchewan, “Legislation Ensuring Fair Balance on Trespass
Rules Moves Forward” (8 May 2019), online: <www.saskatchewan.ca/government/>; See
also: survey results, “Government Releases Results of Trespass Survey” (15 November
2018), online: <www.saskatchewan.ca/government/> [“Government Releases Results”].
See also S. Taylor, “Researcher says Sask. Government’s trespassing laws survey was
‘flawed” (16 November 2019), online: CBC Saskatchewan <www.cbc.ca/news/>.
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than any other Canadian jurisdiction in requiring express permission to
enter rural property.24 In short, the effect is to deem any entrant onto rural
property in the province as a “trespasser.” These amendments have been
strongly opposed by Indigenous nations in Saskatchewan, who assert both
that they are an unconstitutional restriction on their Treaty rights and that
they will lead to more violent confrontations.25 Combined with poorly
informed ideas about the right to defend private property using violence,
the new legislation raises concerns about vigilantism and property owners
taking the law into their own hands to deal with trespassers.
In addition to recourse to police powers and civil action, common law
has allowed landowners to lawfully defend their property against trespass.
The duty to retreat from a threat, rather than to respond with lethal
violence, has been a core element of English law for centuries, upholding
the role of the state in meting out justice in a “civilized” society.26 However,
the “castle doctrine” which emerged as a crucial exception, can be traced
back to the comments of Lord Coke in the 1604 Semayne’s Case. He stated,
“the house of every one [sic] is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for
his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.”27 The doctrine
provides legal protections for those who defend their property from an
intruder rather than retreat. Under common law, a person could use
deadly force to defend their home, but only after using every reasonable
means to avoid the danger.28 In the United States, use-of-force laws vary
by state, as does their interpretation by police, prosecutors, and judges.29
However, neither the castle doctrine, nor more recent American so-called
stand your ground legislation—which protects those who use force to
protect their property—justify an attack without cause, and the law varies
regarding the degrees of permissible lethal force.30

24
See the comparative chart of express permission requirements provided in
the Saskatchewan government’s Review of Trespass Related Legislation in Government
Releases Results, supra note 23 at 8.
25
“FSIN leaders vote to oppose trespassing laws” (20 February 2019), online: CTV
Regina <regina.ctvnews.ca/> [FSIN leaders]. See also Kelly Geraldine Malone, “Indigenous
people worry Saskatchewan trespassing plan may stoke racial tensions” (4 November
2018), online: Saskatchewan Leader Post <leaderpost.com/news/>.
26
Sir William Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England
(1796).
27
Semayne’s Case, (1604) 5 Co Rep 91a, 77 ER 194 (KB) at 195.
28
See generally Stanley Yeo, “Killing a Home Invader” (2011) 57 Crim LQ 181.
29
Mark Randall & Hendrik DeBoer, The Castle Doctrine and Stand-Your-Ground
Law (Connecticut: Office of Legislative Research, OLR Research Report, 24 April 2012),
online: Connecticut General Assembly <www.cga.ct.gov/>.
30
Ibid.
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The castle doctrine, though simple in description, involves social and
legal ambiguity. On one hand, no jurisdiction allows the express ability
to kill another person for accessing or trespassing onto one’s property.31
On the other hand, the castle doctrine suggests moral justification in
protecting one’s property and defending against perceived threats to one’s
person associated with an invasion of one’s “home.”32 This contradiction
has led to considerable debate in the United States and elsewhere about
the philosophical justification of the castle doctrine, where highly
controversial killings of young—usually Black—men have escaped legal
punishment based on the “reasonableness” of the perceived threat posed
by the victim.33 Caroline Light’s study of stand your ground laws in the
United States exposes the castle doctrine as firmly rooted in racist and
misogynist foundations of the White supremacist, settler colonial state.34
The “right” to honourably defend life and property, rather than retreat
in the face of an intrusion, is grounded in the right to own property,
which largely formally excluded all but White men in colonial North
America, and informally continues to be linked to systemic inequality.35
In the context of the unequal distribution of property rights, the Canadian
Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies noted that the defence of property
“prima facie reinforces inequalities.”36 Jeannie Suk argues that the castle
doctrine constructs trespass as a kind of boundary-crossing “beyond the
protection of the law” and into a space in which “the state monopoly on
violence” is suspended.37 Both Suk and Light concluded that only certain
types of homes and homeowners merit this type of protection. Other lives
and bodies retain only a tenuous right to belong and inhabit.
In Saskatchewan, where the Stanley trial took place, the castle
doctrine was invoked to justify the use of force to defend the agrarian
idyll of the rural farm.38 Some local news media coverage suggested that
there is something sacred and defensible about the rural home, and that

31

Bull 281.

See Stanley Yeo, “Killing in defence of property” (2010) 36:2 Commonwealth L

32
See Jeannie Suk, At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence Revolution is
Transforming Privacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
33
Ibid.
34
Stand Your Ground: A History of America’s Love Affair with Lethal Self-Defense
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2017).
35
Ibid at 20.
36
Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, “Reforming Criminal Code
Defences: Provocation, Self-Defence and Defence of Property” (2013), online (pdf):
<www.caefs.ca> [CAEFS].
37
Suk, supra note 32 at 59.
38
Tammy Robert, “No, rural Prairie dwellers, you can’t shoot to protect your
property” (8 February 2018), online: Maclean’s <www.macleans.ca/news/>.
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laws should reinforce this sentiment.39 Racial bias against Indigenous
youths are apparent in many of these accounts, at times both implicitly
and explicitly.40 The presumed reasonableness of race-based fear and
stereotypes was based on a construction of a peaceful, productive White
farmer and a savage Indigenous invader.
A) Historical treatment of trespass in the defence of
property
The right to defend property is restricted under the Criminal Code and in
common law.41 Several sections of the Criminal Code excuse or justify what
would otherwise constitute violations of prohibited conduct because of
specified extenuating circumstances.42 Canadian law has long recognized
the right “of the occupier of land to use force to remove a trespasser.”43
In the current Criminal Code, section 35 provides a justification for use
of force where an accused’s actions were for the purpose of protecting
property.
This section was amended in 2012 to consolidate several sections that
permitted limited defence of property using force, which were commonly
criticized as being confusing and overly complex. Defence of property
requires an honest-but-reasonable belief that the defendant is either
in “peaceable possession” of the property or, is assisting someone else
in peaceable possession of the property.44 It also requires a reasonable
belief that the other person is entering the property unlawfully or for an
unlawful purpose, such as theft or vandalism.45 If both of these criteria
are met, the defence provides for the use of force to prevent the unlawful
act or to remove the person. However, the force used must be reasonable
in the particular circumstances of the event. Section 35 does not provide

39

Jason Markusoff, “Alberta farm shooting is a new touchstone for rural gun
owners” (10 March 2018), online: Maclean’s <www.macleans.ca/news/>.
40
Kyle Edwards, “In Saskatchewan, the Stanley verdict has re-opened centuriesold wounds” (5 March 2018), online: Maclean’s <www.macleans.ca/news/>.
41
Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 8(3). The defence of property through operation
of the common law is also preserved by s 8(3) of the Criminal Code.
42
R v Green, 2017 ONCJ 705 at para 69 [Green].
43
R v Scopelliti, 34 OR (2d) 524, 1981 CarswellOnt 814 (WL Can) at para 67 (SC
(AD)) [Scopelliti], cited in R v Gilley, 332 NFLD & PEIR, 2013 CanLII 1 at para 20 (Prov Ct
(Crim Div)) [Gilley]. See also Grant Smyth Garneau, “Law Reform Commission of Canada
and the Defence of Justification” (1983) 26:1 Crim LQ 121.
44
Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 35(1)(a).
45
Ibid, s 35(1)(b).
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any guidance on what is reasonable.46 This is in sharp contrast with the
self-defence provision in section 34, which enumerates specific factors.47
Although there is no express limitation on the amount of force that may
be used to defend property from interference, Canadian courts have
held that it is not reasonable to use deadly force in defence of property
alone.48 The use of deadly force is only reasonable in very exceptional
circumstances, for example where it is necessary to protect a person from
death or grievous bodily harm, and thus, where the defence of property
overlaps with self-defence.
In R v Gunning, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) specified the
elements of the defence, stipulating that the force used by a person in
peaceable possession of a dwelling house to eject a trespasser “must have
been reasonable in all the circumstances.”49 In that case, the parties agreed,
and the SCC accepted, that “the intentional killing of a trespasser could
only be justified where the person in possession of the property is able to
make out a case of self-defence.”50 The Court set out the following criteria:
the defendant must have been in possession of the dwelling-house; the
possession must have been peaceable; there must have been a trespasser;
and the force used to eject the trespasser must have been reasonable in all

46
See e.g. R v Cormier, 2017 NBCA 10 at para 47 [Cormier]. See also Kent Roach,
“A Preliminary Assessment of the New Self-Defence and Defence of Property Provisions”
(2012) 16:3 Can Crim L Rev 275 at 296 [Roach].
47
See Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 34(2), which states:
In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances,
the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other
parties and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors: (a)
the nature of the force or threat; (b) the extent to which the use of force was
imminent and whether there were other means available to respond to the
potential use of force; (c) the person’s role in the incident; (d) whether any
party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; (e) the size, age,
gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident; (f) the nature,
duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the incident,
including any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force or threat;
(f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the
incident; (g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use
or threat of force; and (h) whether the act committed was in response to a use
or threat of force that the person knew was lawful.
48
R v Williams, 2017 BCPC 230 at para 30 [Williams].
49
R v Gunning, 2005 SCC 27 at para 25 [Gunning].
50
Ibid at para 26. For this proposition, Justice Charron points to R v Baxter, 1975
CanLII 1510, (Ont CA) at 114–15, 1975 CarswellOnt 54 at para 60 (WL Can) [Baxter]; R
v Clark (1983), 44 AR 141, 1983 ABCA 65 (CanLII) at para 33 (CA); and R c Bacon, 1999
CanLII 13568, 1999 CarswellQue 67 at para 24 (CA) (WL Can).
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circumstances.51 In other words, a response in defence of property must
be objectively assessed as reasonable in the circumstances.52
In R v McKay, the SCC emphasized that it did not affirm various
principles that the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision had declared
emergent from early English case law.53 The Court of Appeal, stated at
para 14:
The self defence and defence of property provisions in the Code, which find
their genesis in the common law defence of possession jurisprudence for both
civil and criminal cases, have changed little since the first enactment of the Code
in 1892. Thus, early English criminal and civil cases are often referred to in the
decisions that consider these provisions. … For example, where the removal of a
mere trespasser in defence of property is concerned, only minor force such as a
push, or gentle laying of hands, will be justified.54 In defence of property alone,
an accused will not be justified in beating or wounding a trespasser,55 kicking a
trespasser,56 using a weapon such as an axe,57 or firing a pistol.58 On the other
hand, where an accused has been struck by the trespasser59, or there has been an
attack or violence on the accused’s home [citations omitted] or the accused’s life is

51
Baxter, supra note 50 at 113. Quoted with approval in R v Szczerbaniwicz, 2010
SCC 15 at para 19 [Szczerbaniwicz]:
The sections of the Code authorizing the use of force in defence of a person
or property, to prevent crime, and to apprehend offenders, in general, express
in greater detail the great principle of the common law that the use of force in
such circumstances is subject to the restriction that the force used is necessary;
that is, that the harm sought to be prevented could not be prevented by less
violent means and that the injury or harm done by, or which might reasonably
be anticipated from the force used is not disproportionate to the injury or
harm it is intended to prevent [emphasis added]. See also, Gilley, supra note
43 at para 20.
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threatened [citations omitted], then more force, even force causing death, may be
justified under the principles of self defence.

In its three-paragraph decision, the SCC expressly refused to endorse
elements of the Court of Appeal’s review of the scope of the defence of
property, and specifically rejected the establishment of categorical rules
against “anything more than minor force” against a trespasser or “the
intentional use of a weapon” in defence of property alone.60
In Baxter, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the “firing at
a mere trespasser is, of course, not justifiable.”61 Additionally, an alleged
trespasser must be given time to comply before an occupier can use force
to expel them.62 In R c Harvey, the Quebec Court of Appeal concluded
that because the defendant did not give an alleged trespasser the necessary
time to comply, the accused could not avail himself of the defence of
property.63 It further specified that “[t]he owner or possessor of property,
before considering an individual a trespasser and having the right to
remove the person, must first inform the trespasser that his presence is
no longer desired, must order him to leave and finally, must give him the
necessary time to do so.”64 This is consistent with the common law, which
gives an “implied licence to any member of the public coming on his lawful
business to come through the gate, up the steps, and knock on the door of
the house.”65 Whether or not the trespasser was given an opportunity to
leave without the use of force is considered to be an important part of the
analysis regarding whether the force used was reasonable.66
B) Defence of property under the Criminal Code
In 2012, the defence of property in section 35 was amended through
Bill C-26, which entered into force on March 11, 2013.67 The new
amendments were intended to simplify existing law and extract the
60
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63
2016 QCCQ 8713 at para 97 [Harvey].
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core of the defence.68 The Parliamentary Secretary cited the work of
Professor Don Stuart, who wrote: “The defences of person and property
in Canadian law are bedevilled by excessively complex and sometimes
obtuse Code provisions.”69 The amendments were intended to clean up
legislation in order to remedy potential jury confusion, avoid unnecessary
grounds of appeal, and help the public, police, prosecutors, and the court
understand the legislation’s intent and application.70 Courts have since
been navigating its application.71
Some lawmakers have suggested that the reforms were more than
simply an administrative clean-up. The Justice Minister affirmed that
warning shots over the head of intruders on private property would be
reasonable under the provisions of the amended law, even though this
legal position had not yet been affirmed by the courts.72 At a public event
in 2015, then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper controversially linked gun
ownership with security for rural property owners. His office subsequently
sent out a communication referring to Harper’s comments that Jenni
Byrne, the Conservatives’ national campaign manager paraphrased as
“gun ownership is important for safety for those of us who live a ways from
immediate police assistance” and continued, “Our Conservative party

68
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recognizes that guns play an important role in the livelihoods, recreation
and safety of many Canadians.”73
Additionally, the amended provision omitted an important feature
of the prior provision: the proportionality requirement. The SCC had
previously endorsed a proportionality approach in R v Szczerbaniwicz. The
majority and dissent disagreed about the application of proportionality.
The majority cited the necessity restriction set out in Baxter, in which Justice
Martin stated, “the harm sought to be prevented could not be prevented
by less violent means and that the injury or harm done by, or which might
reasonably be anticipated from the force used is not disproportioned [sic]
to the injury or harm it is intended to prevent.”74 The proportionality
requirement has been characterized as an inquiry into whether the force
used was “reasonable in all the circumstances.”75 The reasonableness of
“all the circumstances” necessarily includes the accused’s subjective belief
as to the nature of the danger or harm, but an objective component of the
defence is also required: the subjective belief must be based on reasonable
grounds.76 Professor Kent Roach expressed concern that the removal of
the proportionality requirement in the 2012 amendment to section 35
could strengthen a “disproportionately violent” defence of property by an
accused.77 To date, there has been no jurisprudence regarding the effects
of this removal.78
In short, under civil law, an individual who is deemed to be a trespasser
can be met with consequences ranging from a civil remedy of damages,
to an injunction, to a modest fine. Defence of property permits a person
in peaceable possession of property, or a person assisting someone they
believe to be in peaceable possession of property, to commit a reasonable
act (including use of force) for the purpose of protecting that property
from being taken, damaged, or trespassed upon. The next section sets
out the manner in which trespass and defence of property were raised in
Stanley, and how it came to be that although the defence itself was not
asserted, trespass still shaped the outcome of the trial.
73

Ibid.
Baxter, supra note 50 at 113.
75
Justice Charron confirmed in Gunning, supra note 49 at para 25, a case involving
s 41(1). See also R v George, 49 OR (3d) 144, 2000 CanLII 5727 at para 49 (CA) [George];
R v McKay (AJ), 2009 MBCA 53 at para 23 [McKay, 2009].
76
See Szczerbaniwicz, supra note 51 at paras 2, 21; McKay, 2009, supra note 75 at
paras 23–24; George, supra note 75 at paras 49–50; R v Born with a Tooth, 131 AR 193, 1992
ABCA 244 at paras 26, 35–36 [Born with a Tooth]; R v Kong, 2005 ABCA 255, at paras 6,
95–100, appeal allowed on other grounds in 2006 SCC 40.
77
Roach, supra note 46 at 297.
78
See e.g. R v Harris, 2014 ONCJ 401 at para 58.
74

372

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[Vol. 98

3. Raising Trespass without Defence of Property
A) ‘Air of reality’ and defence of property
In criminal law, unique tests are associated with different defences, and
each and every prong of the test requires an evidentiary foundation (“air
of reality”).79 Defences must have an air of reality in order to be included
by judges in their jury instructions.80 It is the responsibility of defence
counsel to establish the existence of an evidentiary basis for the defence.81
In R v Cinous, the SCC stated:
The basic requirement of an evidential foundation for defences gives rise to two
well-established principles. First, a trial judge must put to the jury all defences
that arise on the facts, whether or not they have been specifically raised by an
accused. Where there is an air of reality to a defence, it should go to the jury.
Second, a trial judge has a positive duty to keep from the jury defences lacking an
evidential foundation. A defence that lacks an air of reality should be kept from
the jury [citations omitted]. This is so even when the defence lacking an air of
reality represents the accused’s only chance for an acquittal[.]82

Where the accused invokes the defence of property, the onus is on the
Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
act in defence of property.83 However, the Court in Gunning found that,
“[i]t is not incumbent upon the Crown in every trial to negative [sic] all
conceivable defences no matter how fanciful or speculative they may
be.”84 A minimum evidentiary threshold must be met before the issue is
“put in play”—a defence will be in play whenever a properly instructed
jury could reasonably, on account of the evidence, conclude in favour of
the accused.85
In R v Weare, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal concluded that even
where a trial judge may find a victim to not be a trespasser, the trial judge
must go on to consider whether there is any evidence that could rationally
form the foundation for a reasonable belief that the complainant was a
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trespasser. If so, the defence of property must be considered.86 If not, as in
R v Leggot, “[t]here is no possibility the verdict would have been different
had the trial judge specifically turned his mind to the question of whether
the appellant believed she was a trespasser.”87 Failure on the judge’s part in
either of these determinations is an error of law.88 An appellate court must
determine if “there is any reasonable possibility that the verdict would have
been different had the error at issue not been made.”89 In other words,
if the Crown does not object, the judge has a positive duty to intervene
so that the jury does not illegitimately rely on an unavailable defence
of property in its deliberations. As was upheld by the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal, in R v O’Brien, a judge may put two defences to the
jury, assuming there is evidence to support the objective and subjective
elements of each component of the defences.90 However, the instructions
put to the jury must not be “contradictory” or “confusing.”91
B) A ‘self-defence circumstance’
In Stanley, the judge addressed the air of reality even though the accused
did not formally argue the defence of property, because it formed part of
the defence’s case. In particular, the defence was used implicitly to justify
Stanley’s use of the gun to respond to the presence of the youths on his
property. Defence counsel asserted that the conduct of the young people
contributed to the accident by creating a “self-defence circumstance.”
Stanley’s lawyer, Scott Spencer, opened the trial by stating that Stanley and
his son (who was also on the farm that day) were not “looking for trouble”
when the grey SUV pulled up.92 Spencer stated:
Colten Boushie’s death is a tragedy. There is no doubt about that. And we can
never lose sight of that. No one will lose sight of that. And I’ll also say right now,
this isn’t a justified death. This is not—it’s not—this death is not justified legally
or morally. It is never, never right to take somebody’s life over property, but that’s

86
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not what this case is about. It is perhaps in the rarest of circumstances appropriate
to use lethal force to defend you or your family. But this isn’t that case, either.93

Spencer argued that the case was not only about property or self-defence
case, commenting “this is really not a murder case at all.”94 Instead, he
argued that “[t]his is a case about what can go terribly wrong when you
create a situation which is in the nature of a home invasion.”95 According
to Spencer, Stanley did not have the luxury of waiting for police to arrive
at his isolated farm. He acknowledged that the young people were not
on trial, but alleged that they had created a ‘panic situation.’ As a result,
Spencer argued it was ‘reasonable’ to fire warning shots at intruders.96
According to journalist Olivia Stefanovich, “[a]lthough he didn’t argue
self-defence, Stanley testified that he drew his gun when Boushie and his
friends drove onto his rural property to fire warning shots because he
thought they were stealing.”97
Spencer explained the events leading up to the allegedly accidental
deadly shot by invoking the castle doctrine and linking trespass to the fear
of violent invasion. He argued that while the shooting was not justified in
self-defence, “there is a self-defence factor” based on the “reasonableness”
of “what can you do to protect yourself in those circumstances?”98 Spencer
acknowledged that “you can’t use lethal force,” but also asked, “is it
reasonable to attempt to deal with the circumstance to defend you and
your family? And it’s not about property. It’s about injury. That was the
fear.”99 He characterized the youths as “essentially intruders”: “[Y]ou have
to view it from Gerry [Stanley]’s perspective … what he thought when
he was faced with this sudden intrusion. The fear of the unknown.”100
According to Spencer, a “self-defence circumstance” did not give rise to
the defence of property, but rather to accident.101 The defence successfully
used the defence of property to separate the events leading up to the fatal
shot from the shot itself. Spencer was able to justify the use of the gun by
93
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invoking Stanley’s right to defend his property without having to justify
the tragic consequences.
C) Consideration of the defence of property by the court
At trial, the Court considered Stanley’s firing of shots in the air in the
context of self-defence and the defence of property.102 The Court rightfully
cautioned that in the jury charge the parties needed to be “very careful
that we ground everything in the evidence that has been called thus far
so there is a bit of an air of reality.”103 Chief Justice Popescul struggled to
make sense of how the evidence raised during the trial translated into a
jury charge: “[T]o be as honest as I can with you, which is—I am seeking
guidance from very experienced lawyers to help me get the charge right so
that I can present a fair, balanced, legally accurate charge to the jury.”104
The defence framed Stanley’s use of the gun as, “[S]elf-defence is a
justification, a lawful justification, for firing the warning shots.”105 The
Court disagreed, suggesting instead that:
[T]he evidence seems to suggest that if anything, he was trying to scare them off his
property. His property had been tampered with. He was in peaceable possession of
the property, and the question would be whether or not he took reasonable steps
to scare them off his property. That would be defence of property[.]106

The Court referred to various scenarios that would explain Stanley’s
firing of the gun in the air when the youths entered the farm without
raising the defence of property. Spencer acknowledged there would be no
justification for firing against someone for merely entering a property,107
but agreed that in a situation where a trespasser was asked to leave, firing
a gun would fall under the defence of property.108 Chief Justice Popescul
clarified the defence’s position that “up until a certain point … he [was]
justified in firing a few rounds in the air,” but also noted that “if somebody
has a … gun of any sort, and if it goes off and kills somebody, they’ve got
some explaining to do.”109

102
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103 Ibid at 804, lines 5–6.
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The Crown asked whether the defence of property for Stanley’s
firing of the weapon in the air should be put to the jury.110 Senior Crown
Prosecutor Bill Burge noted that putting the defence of property to the
jury for this part of the legal story would get “pretty complicated.”111
This is consistent with the case of O’Brien, where the Court found that
raising both the defence of accident and the defence of property could be
confusing to the jury.112 Chief Justice Popescul proposed, “would it be fair
to say that in the circumstances of this case, the Crown and defence agree
that Mr. Stanley’s actions in getting the gun was—was lawful, and that if
you find he fired them in the air, that in and of itself is lawful, as well?”113
Burge agreed to “make the concession that this is—this is within his right
as a property owner.”114 In doing so, the Crown implicitly condoned the
defence’s racist trespass narrative and the presumptive reasonableness of
Stanley’s fear-driven violent response, which simultaneously became both
core elements of the case and immune from further questions or critiques.
The judge, prosecutor, and defence agreed to bifurcate the events on
the farm, such that the firing of the gun in the air was lawful under each
of the elements of section 35 of the Criminal Code, but the next set of
events would need to be considered by the jury on the basis of defence
of accident. They agreed that the charge would read, “Mr. Stanley was
lawfully justified in the circumstances of this case to retrieve his firearm
and to fire it into the air as a warning—as warning shots, if you find that
is what he did. Beyond that, it is up to you to determine if his acts were
lawful.”115 Chief Justice Popescul explained the charge as follows:
[W]hat we’re doing is we are focussing the jury on the parts that matter. So rather
than the jury coming back with a question for me, well, was it lawful in the first
place for him to have this gun and can he shoot it in the air, is that all right? We’re
saying, yeah, that’s all fine up until this point. … if he was firing them in the air,
that that was lawful up to that point, and beyond then, that’s what we have to …
worry about.116

In the end, Chief Justice Popescul stated in his instructions to the jury:
I have already told you that it is not disputed that Mr. Stanley was legally justified
in defence of his property, to retrieve his handgun and fire it into the air, if you find
that that is what he did, in light of what had gone on in his farmyard. However,
110
111
112
113
114
115
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you must now closely analyze whether his actions between that point and the
shooting of Mr. Boushie amount to careless use of that firearm and whether he
had a lawful excuse.117

Put another way, Stanley’s act of shooting the gun in the air was justified by
the Court on the basis of the defence of property without any consideration
by the jury. Stanley’s fear of Indigenous youths and their status as
trespassers were deemed presumptively reasonable. The lawfulness of his
resort to violence, without warning or a request for them to leave, was
deemed by the Court, with consent of the Crown, not to matter.
4. Dismantling the Castle: Indigenous Peoples and Trespass
Gerald Stanley’s acquittal had an impact on the justice system more
broadly, but it also has particularly negative consequences for Indigenous
persons in the context of Treaty relations and trespass, as discussed below.
A) Trespass in the context of Treaty relations
Despite the centrality of treaties to the foundation of Canada as a
nation state, the legal construction of trespass in Canadian law does
not acknowledge Treaty rights and relationships. Nor does it allow for
the consideration of non-human, past, or future beneficiaries to whom
legal duties may be owed under Indigenous law.118 As Michael Asch
noted, “one cannot have Confederation until there is a home on which
to build it, and without treaties we have no home here.”119 Settler claims
117 Ibid at 898, lines 17–21. See also “Full transcript of judge’s instructions to Colten
Boushie jury: Put yourself in a juror’s shoes” (14 February 2018), online: National Post
<nationalpost.com/news/>.
118 CED 4th (online), Torts, “Trespass” (II.1.) at § 29. For discussion of treaty
relations in Saskatchewan, see Harold Cardinal & Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of
Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized As
Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000) [Cardinal & Hildebrandt]. For a
general discussion on treaty relations between the Crown and Indigenous people see John
Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation
of Historical Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017); Sheldon Krasowski,
No Surrender: The Land Remains Indigenous (Regina: University of Regina Press, 2019)
[Krasowski]. For a discussion of Indigenous law and treaty relations with non-human
nature and past or future generations, see John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous constitution
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). See also Leanne Simpson, “Looking after
Gdoo-naaganinaa: Precolonial Nishnaabeg diplomatic and treaty relationships” (2008)
23:2 Wicazo Sa Review 29.
119 Michael Asch, “Confederation Treaties and Reconciliation: Stepping Back
into the Future” in Michael Asch, John Borrows & James Tully, eds, Resurgence and
Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2018) 29 at 42 [Asch].
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to belonging, which is at the root of peaceable possession, therefore relies
on the legitimacy and the honouring of the treaties, and “keeping those
promises is inviolate, for to violate these promises is to invalidate our right
to be here.”120
Boushie’s death and the Stanley trial took place on Treaty 6 territory.121
This means that Stanley’s farm was located on contested land. Historian
Sheldon Krasowski conducted a detailed examination of Indigenous and
non-Indigenous accounts of the negotiations involved historic treaties. He
demonstrated that official Canadian accounts refer to the negotiations for
Treaty 6 cession and surrender of Indigenous land to the Crown, but that
both eyewitness accounts and oral histories contradict these accounts.122
Accounts of meetings leading up to the negotiations reveal that Treaty 6
Chiefs were mainly concerned with the protection of Indigenous lands
from encroachment, and as a result this was the main point of discussion.123
Cree lawyer Sharon Venne explained that all Indigenous nations in
the Treaty 6 territory would have followed protocol requesting the Crown
to enter into a Treaty before coming onto their land, in recognition of
their jurisdiction over the area.124 She explained that this was the only
valid way for others—Indigenous nations or the Crown—to come onto
the land.125 Indeed, upon learning about the acquisition of land in their
territory by the Hudson’s Bay Company, the Chiefs quickly asserted
their jurisdiction and requested that the Queen resolve the issue, clearly
asserting that the transactions were invalid under Indigenous law. In
the lead-up to Treaty 6 negotiations, the Cree stopped surveyors and the
construction of telegraph lines, demanding that the Crown recognize their
authority over their lands.126 When the Crown requested to make a treaty
in the lands that make up Treaty 6, the relevant Indigenous nations (Cree,
Assiniboine, Saulteux, and Dene) formed an alliance and held several days
of meetings to reach an agreement about their position. Only then did
they meet with the Crown. The Indigenous parties selected the site and
negotiations were conducted in accordance with Indigenous protocols,
120
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including the Cree Sacred Pipe Ceremony, which linked the partners in
an unbreakable relationship “based on happiness, health, and respect.”127
The oral histories of Treaty 6 Elders assert that there was no cede and
surrender clause agreed to in the Treaty’s negotiations.128 As noted above,
this has been confirmed by eyewitness accounts from non-Indigenous
observers. Rather, the land was requested for shared use by settlers. Venne
noted that this was interpreted as a loan and not a sale, which would
not have been agreed to either as a matter of logic or as a possibility in
Indigenous law.129 As Michael Coyle noted, “[b]ecause the historical land
treaty was an institution established for the purpose of permitting the
coexistence of two sets of peoples on treaty lands, it cannot be rationally
interpreted as effecting an entirely improvident arrangement for one of
the treaty parties.”130 The Chiefs interpreted the agreement to mean that
they could hold as much land for themselves as they wanted: according to
Elders, reserves were not lands given to Indigenous Peoples by the Crown,
because the Crown had no jurisdiction over the land. In an exchange
unrecorded in official accounts but recorded by the Chief’s translator,
Peter Erasmus, Chief Poundmaker responded to the “audacity of the
treaty commissioner to describe reserved lands as one of the benefits of the
treaty.”131 Chief Poundmaker commented, “This is our land it isn’t a piece
of pemmican to be cut off and given in little pieces back to us. It is ours
and we will take what we want.”132 Sharing of the land was interpreted as
ensuring the people “would never be in want as they had ensured their
future good life by sharing their lands.”133 According to Venne, the Treaty
was also not understood as extending to the subsurface, to the waters, or to
animals, including birds. Further, mountains and lands within four days
walk could not have been included because of their spiritual significance.
Venne also noted that the promise of police protection was a key part of
the Treaty. Specifically, the Northwest Mounted Police were permitted
into the territory for the protection of Indigenous peoples against
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settlers.134 Crucially, as Venne pointed out, the Treaty records the rights
and obligations of non-Indigenous peoples in the territory—the rights
to share the land and resources, to coexist peacefully with Indigenous
neighbours, and to care for the land.135 All of these elements require
fulfilling the promises fairly and honourably made to Indigenous Treaty
partners.136
As described above, the concept of trespass assumes clear title. Indeed,
the defence of property relies on the concept of peaceable possession, the
old English legal concept requiring that there be no adverse claims to the
lands in question.137 Once one acknowledges the multiple and overlapping
relationships with private land, as evidenced by the discussion of historic
treaties above, the concept of peaceable possession becomes much more
difficult to sustain. Certainly, it complicates Stanley’s quick resort to
violence and the link between the “reasonableness” of his fears and the
racist and colonial underpinnings of the trespass narrative woven into the
Stanley trial by the defence. The next section builds on this discussion,
and the troubling way that Indigenous attempts to invoke the defence of
property and protect their own lands are managed.
B) Defence of property and Indigenous lands
Canadian courts treat lands claimed by Indigenous communities and
non-Indigenous people differently with regard to trespass and defence of
property. For example, the courts have categorically rejected Indigenous
title as a challenge to defence of property. The Ontario Court of Justice
has stated that there are “two legalities … the defendant has no right to the
property, and the complainant has all the right to the property.”138 In R
v Cormier, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal stated that “interference
with “peaceable possession” of property” means someone is either: “about
to enter, entering or having entered to the property, without lawful
entitlement; … about to take, taking or having just taken the property; or
… about to damage or destroy or in the process of damaging or destroying
the property or making it inoperative.”139
Courts have found that these criteria do not apply to First Nations
lands, either reserve or traditional territory. Some have adopted the
definition of “peaceable possession” published in Black’s Law Dictionary:
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“[such] as is acquiesced in by all other persons, including rival claimants,
and not disturbed by any forcible attempt at ouster nor by adverse suits
to recover the possession of the estate.”140 The Alberta Court of Appeal
elaborated on this definition, stating that the word “peaceable” is not
synonymous with “peaceful.”141 Instead, “peaceable” means possession
that is “not seriously challenged by others”142 and any challenge to the
possession should be “unlikely to lead to violence.”143
As noted by the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, the
use of the “peaceable possession” rule against Indigenous land defenders
who are attempting to protect their lands unjustly ignores the violent and
racist means by which Indigenous peoples have been dispossessed, and
are therefore unable to satisfy the standard.144
In George, an Ontario park was occupied by Indigenous peoples. The
park had originally been part of an Aboriginal land grant, but had been
expropriated by the federal government.145 When violence broke out
between the occupiers and the police, the Court rejected the Indigenous
defendant’s defence of property claim because the occupation of the park
was clearly challenged from the outset. It stated that the defendant was
aware of this challenge, and therefore did not have “an honest but mistaken
belief in the nature of the Band members’ possession of the park.”146
Peaceable possession, in contrast, is understood as possession that is not
seriously challenged by others and is therefore unlikely to lead to violence.
In George, the Court found that the Indigenous defendants were aware
that their possession of the park was challenged from the outset. Indeed,
it was noted that they had stockpiled sticks and rocks in contemplation of
violence. The Court also found that their use of force against the police
was not necessary, reasonable, or proportionate.147
In R v Born with a Tooth, members of the Peigan Nation had camped
in a right-of-way area over which they did not have peaceful possession,
even if they did have some rights.148 Police officers and others attempted
to gain access to the area in question. The Court noted:

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

George, supra note 75 at para 40.
Born with a Tooth, supra note 76 at para 28.
Ibid at para 29.
Ibid at para 30.
CAEFS, supra note 36.
George, supra note 75.
Ibid at para 46.
Ibid, see especially paras 43–46, 50.
Born with a Tooth, supra note 76 at para 20.

382

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[Vol. 98

An accused might, honestly but mistakenly, believe that he has a measure of
control over the lands, or that his supposed control is unchallenged, or he might
believe in a set of facts which, if true, makes the victim a trespasser. But honest
mistake of fact appears not to be enough for the last element, because that requires
that the reasonableness of the force meet an objective, not just a subjective, test.149

The Court concluded, “all citizens of Canada have a duty to inform
themselves correctly about the law” and that failure to do so cannot be
used as a defence.150 As a result, in this case there could be no finding
of peaceable possession, and therefore, no application of the defence of
property.151 This situation creates an imbalance in the application of the
defence of property to Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationships with
land.152 It also fundamentally ignores the existence and tenets of treaties,
most significantly the role of Indigenous legal orders—both internally
for Indigenous nations, and externally in shaping Canadian property
relations through treaty partnerships. In other parts of Canada, it ignores
the assertion of title and jurisdiction over land and resources in both
Canadian and Indigenous law.
Failure to recognize Indigenous relations to land as a root of
possession that can be lawfully exercised and defended leads to individual
injustices for the Indigenous parties in cases such as these. It also
perpetuates the colonial model of unitary Crown sovereignty, which leads
to intractable conflicts about the governance of land and resources.153 The
Yellowhead Institute recently found that 76 percent of injunctions filed
by corporations against First Nations—often deemed to be trespassing as
they defend traditional territory from development—were granted, while
less than 20 percent of those filed by First Nations against corporations
or governments were granted.154 It concluded that Indigenous law has
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not been accepted by the courts as a defensible basis for trespass.155 As
we write, Indigenous land protectors and allies are being arrested and
forcibly removed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police from unceded
Wet’suwet’en territory in British Columbia to enforce an injunction
allowing a private gas company to build a pipeline along “Crown” land,
despite being evicted by the heredity chiefs, who were recognized by the
SCC as the land holders in the landmark Delgamuukw v British Columbia
decision.156 Protests throughout Canada continue to shut down highways,
bridges, and rail corridors in solidarity.157
The differential treatment of Indigenous claims to property rights and
the availability of the defence of property are compounded by the failure
of the criminal justice system to ensure that Indigenous victims of crime
are not themselves criminalized and dehumanized as a result of racial bias
and stereotypes. As the SCC has observed “[it] would be naïve to assume
that the moment the jurors enter the courtroom, they leave their biases,
prejudices, and sympathies behind.”158 The next section explores the
failure of the judge in the Stanley trial to address the intersection between
Saskatchewan’s contested property relations and racial prejudice.
C) Jury instructions in cases of Indigenous victims and
trespass claims
In the Stanley trial, the jury was not cautioned about local claims of trespass
allegedly caused by Indigenous youths nor the high level of discrimination
against Indigenous peoples. Instead, in regard to witnesses, Chief Justice
Popescul stated:
Did the witness seem to be reporting to you what he or she saw and heard or
simply putting together an account based on … other sources[?] Did the witness’s
testimony seem reasonable and consistent? Is it similar to or different from what
other witnesses said about the same events? Did the witness say or do something
different on an earlier occasion? … Is the inconsistency about something important
or a minor detail? Does it seem like an honest mistake? Is it a deliberate lie? Is the
inconsistency because the witness said something different or because he or she
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failed to mention something? Is there any explanation for it? Does the explanation
make sense? What was the witness’s manner when he or she testified?159

Chief Justice Popescul gave only the following cautions:
“[D]o not jump to conclusions based entirely on how a witness has testified. Looks
can be deceiving. Giving evidence in a trial is not a common experience for many
witnesses. People react and appear differently. Witnesses come from different
backgrounds. They have different abilities, values and life experiences. There are
simply too many variables to make the manner in which a witness testifies the only
or most important factor in your decision.”160

In the context of Saskatchewan’s contested property relations, the judge
could, and should, have gone further to expressly caution the jury about
racial bias or biased associations with terms used by witnesses or other
actors during the trial.
In Saskatchewan, rural residents and groups have advocated for
looser laws around gun possession and stronger trespass laws to address
alleged increases in “rural crime.”161 As noted above, amendments to the
TPA removed the requirements for notice and enclosure, therefore always
requiring explicit consent to enter private property. The changes mean
that landowners can treat anyone entering their lands as trespassers, even
prior to asking them to leave the property. The Federation of Sovereign
Indigenous Nations (“FSIN”) has expressed serious concerns about the
law and the lack of consultation, and in February 2019 voted to oppose
the amendments. Vice Chief Heather Bear stated that the changes would
cause more rural crime, rather than less.162 The amendments came after
a 2017 decision to arm conservation officers with semi-automatic carbine
rifles, which FSIN also strongly opposed, suggesting it breached inherent
and Treaty rights and would result in more Indigenous people in jail.163
Rural residents have openly discussed the availability of the defence
of property online. In a March 15, 2016 post on the online journal
Ammoland, an anonymous commenter wrote:
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Unless you’ve done something terribly wrong, the odds of you being convicted are
on your side. The CSSA has dealt with many of these types of cases over the years,
and in only one case was the individual convicted. To re-cap:
• Yes, you will be charged with a very serious crime.
• Yes, this will be the most stressful time of your life.
• Yes, this entire process will cost you a lot of money.
However, at the end of it all, justice will usually prevail and you will not go to
prison.164

In R v Barton, the SCC examined the role of the trial judge in addressing
“biases, prejudices, and stereotypes that lurk beneath the surface, thereby
allowing all justice system participants to address them head-on—openly,
honestly, and without fear.”165 At trial, the Crown, the defence, and the trial
judge had repeatedly referred to the Indigenous victim, Cindy Gladue, as
a “prostitute,” “Native girl,” or “Native woman.” The majority of the SCC
in Barton noted the “invasive,” “elusive,” and “corrosive” nature of racism
against Indigenous people in the context of jury trials, as recognized in
Williams.166
They specifically identified the language used to refer to Ms. Gladue
at trial as “problematic”167 and suggested that the use of such descriptors
may give rise to situations where a trial judge should intervene to ensure all
participants in the justice system are treated with “dignity, humanity and
respect.”168 The majority suggested trial judges consider the “additional
safeguard” of “express instruction countering prejudice” beyond a generic
jury instruction about impartiality, which they grounded in sections 15,
7 and 11(d) of the Charter.169 In the context of an Indigenous victim, the
majority specifically noted the relevance of explaining the history and
ongoing effects of colonization and anti-Indigenous racism to jurors, to
ensure that they do not rely on stereotypes and racial prejudices during
their deliberations.170 Justice Moldaver, writing for the majority, did not
go as far as the dissent, according to which the lack of such instructions
164
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rendered the whole trial unfair.171 However, he concluded that by failing
to ensure Ms. Gladue was given the law’s full protection, the criminal
justice system “let her down—indeed, it let us all down.”172
It is very likely that references to Boushie and his friends as
“trespassers” were compounded by systemic racism. The failure to address
such references during the trial and the generic instruction to the jury,
at best, failed to ensure the jury did not draw on “biases prejudices and
stereotypes” about criminality and Indigenous youths and the “reasonable”
nature of being fearful of young Indigenous men.173 At worst, it invited
“devastatingly prejudicial effects,” which may have rendered the entire
process unfair.174 The lack of caution by the judge was compounded by
the lack of consideration as to whether the use of a gun in response to
trespass is ever justifiable. The jury was not required to weigh the very real
possibility that the Indigeneity of these youths, and the claim that they
were trespassing on the Stanley farm, led to the verdict of not guilty.
5. Conclusion
The Stanley trial raised important issues related to the unique land-based
tensions in rural Saskatchewan and how these may have affected the
outcome of the trial. First, the defendant’s legal story was underscored
by narratives of trespass. As defence council noted in the trial, “[f]or farm
people, your yard is your castle.”175 This kind of sentiment also emerged
in local media coverage, and is linked to the reforms of the defence of
property, which were introduced by the Government of Canada in
response to vocal demands to increase “protection” for property owners
who expel alleged trespassers from “their” land. These same sentiments
also underpin recent reforms to Saskatchewan’s TPA.176
Second, the Stanley trial and the resulting precedent has particular
consequence for Indigenous peoples. It reflects the extent to which Treaty
6 and Indigenous relationships with land are generally ignored in criminal
law tests for “peaceable possession”. Specifically, traditional territory is
never peaceably possessed, so the defence of property is not available to
Indigenous peoples seeking to defend these lands. Moreover, although
Treaty 6 is rooted in an agreement to share the land and does not recognize
features of colonial law, such as exclusive ownership, the “reasonableness”
171
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of Stanley’s violent defence of his farm did not account for Indigenous
worldviews and laws.
Third, the judge’s failure to address how the defence’s invocation of
trespass and rural crime could be linked with anti-Indigenous racism may
have contributed to Stanley’s exoneration. As the SCC signaled in Barton,
juries must be made aware of the ways in which biases and prejudices
factor into decision-making. Stanley’s invocation of trespass, the castle
doctrine, and the notion of a “self-defence circumstance” informed the
Crown and the Court’s concession that his use of the firearm was lawful.
As a result, neither defence counsel nor the jury were asked to grapple with
how the reasonableness of his violent actions were grounded in racial bias
and a fear of Indigenous youths. The symbolism of defence of property far
outweighed its formal legal application in this case. The reasonableness
of resorting to violence in defence of property was presumed and was
separated from the tragic consequences. In the specific social context
of rural Saskatchewan, Stanley’s invocations of trespass alongside the
Indigeneity of Boushie and his friends, should have signalled to the trial
judge the he should have included additional safeguards in his jury charge.
He should have given express instructions countering prejudice beyond the
generic jury instruction about impartiality. He should also have clarified
the irrelevance of much of Stanley’s narrative to the determination of
whether the third shot was, in fact, an accident.
The death of Colten Boushie was a tragedy. The Stanley trial was
also a tragedy, because crucial issues remain unexamined and important
questions remain unanswered. We will never know whether jury
instructions that explicitly alerted the jury to the issue of racial bias in
situations of trespass, and in the context of Indigeneity, would have
made a difference. Judges and juries must carefully consider the use of
force to defend property. They must not rely on presumptions and feardriven biases about who belongs, and who matters, on the lands we call
Canada. As Justice Moldaver concluded in Barton, “we can—and must—
do better.”177
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